The ability to see ghosts or god

My Question: How can one justify or make sense of an experiential world wherein some people believe they have seen spirits or ghosts?


 During this week's lesson, I kept wondering about the idea of radical constructivism in the context of people who believe they have seen ghosts or spirits. If there is someone who says that they saw a ghost upstairs or thought they saw an apparition walk by, does that ghost actually exist ? If we are using the radical constructivist theory, the idea that this is something they have experienced means it is, in some sense, real. It now is something they have experienced, for it is a part of their world. However, is that truly applicable? In all logical thinking does that really mean the ghost exists ?


     Although I do not think I came to a solid conclusion, it would seem as though, despite the fact that these individuals have experienced these apparitions, there is no real way to construct the ghosts as something real. However, it is interesting because this entire theory excludes metaphysics, which might contain a logical reason for dismissing the idea of "experiencing ghosts" Despite that possible loopole in the theory, I do not believe that radical constructivist thinking includes the idea of seeing spirits and ghosts. It would seem as though it dismisses those concepts and does not really evaluate them.

No Metaphysics ?

My Question: Can one really explore the idea of conceived apples and experimental work without regarding metaphysics?

In Glasersfeld's argument on radical constructivism, he attempts to prove his thesis that we create, or construct, our own world based on our experiences. His view is indeed radical, and there are a lot of logical aspects that he leaves out in order to make his opinion seem valid. Without considering metapaphysics, his whole theory becomes unstable.

       The idea that one "constructs" one's world based on what one has experienced brings into question things one has not experienced, like a distant country that one is well aware of existing but has not experienced. The idea that this theory could make it so the object or place itself does not exist is very obtuse. It also leaves a lot of room for error. It would seem as though we cannot accurately talk about, or investigate, certain philosophical points without considering what is already set in stone - for which we need metaphysics. In Glasersfeld's argument, he makes he avoids including certain aspects of creating the world - like people and animals - because it is very difficult to consider these things and consider what is real and what is not without considering the metaphysical aspect of it. The author believes it is possible to just construct a world and a reality based on what we have come across. This is still a rather close minded idealology and does not include various realms of things and thoughts. To have such experimental thoughts it is really necessary to include a tangible foundation or concrete thought to base it on. The radical side of constructivism seems to severely lack this ability. It is also very hard to indulge in the idea of experimetnal work without considering a tangible being or object. The idea of experiencing something and that becoming part of a person's world makes sense until you take into account that Glasersfeld will not accept the notion of metaphysics, or at least will not include it into his radical view.

    One can almost go as far as to say that one cannot truly explore the idea of conceived apples and experimental work without metaphysics. Even though Glasersfeld spends a great deal of time explaining his theory, he leaves  gaps in his thesis that make the very radical ideal of constructivism hard to accept. With that in mind, it becomes even more difficult to accept it without including a base like metaphysics.